CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION
IN THE SLAVERY REPARATIONS DEBATE
Kaimipono David Wenger*
The success or failure of slavery reparations will depend on
causation. Many criticisms of reparations have focused on the
attenuated nature of the harm, suggesting that modern claimants are
not connected to slaves, that modern payers are not connected to slave
owners, and that harms suffered by modern Blacks cannot be
connected to slavery. This Article examines these attenuation
concerns and finds that they come in three related but distinct
varieties:
Victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation, and act
attenuation. These three components, defined in this Article, show
themselves in a number of interrelated legal and moral arguments.
The Article then discusses how ideas about causation from the
mass tort context can help address the problems of attenuation in
slavery reparations. Mass tort cases have developed novel methods of
showing causation, such as statistical evidence and market share
liability, and these tools can be used in the reparations context. These
concepts, if used within the reparations context, could help overcome
attenuation.
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The case for slavery reparations is failing. Scholars continue to
write about reparations,1 but they seem increasingly to be the only
ones on the bandwagon. The media is sometimes ambivalent and
occasionally hostile.2 The lukewarm media reception mirrors societal
feelings in general.3 Proposed legislation has failed to advance in
1

See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause
Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 193 nn. 4-5 (collecting legal scholarship
addressing reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery
and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 81, 82-84 (2003) (noting
advances in reparations discussion); Alfred Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal
Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497, 505 (2002)
(discussing development of reparations theory) [hereinafter Brophy, Some
Problems].
Some of the major reparations pieces in recent years include Randall
Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (1999); Should America Pay?:
Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003)
[hereinafter Should America Pay?]; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); and
reparations symposia at New York University, see Symposium, A Dream Deferred:
Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 447 (2002), the University of Memphis, see Symposium,
33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 245 (2003), Boston College, see Symposium, 24 B.C. Third
World L.J. 1 (2004), Boston University, see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of
Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1135 (2004), Harvard, see Symposium, 20
Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 17, and Boalt Hall, see Symposium, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y
Rep. 1 (2004). Modern legal reparations literature is generally acknowledged to
have begun with professor Boris Bittker’s work. See Boris Bittker, The Case for
Black Reparations (Beacon Press 2003) (1973).
2
See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation’s Debt?; Rep. John
Conyers Jr. Has a Question, He’s Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Right
Answer, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1999, at C-01; see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe
Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev.
597, 607 n.29 (collecting media accounts); Wenger, supra note 1, at 195 nn. 6-7
(same).
3
Polls show that overwhelming majorities of whites oppose reparations, while
Blacks support reparations. See Michael Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for
Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, Boston Globe, Aug. 18
2002, at A3 (discussing these findings from the CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll);
Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev.
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Congress.4 Recently, in a closely watched consolidated case, a federal
court dismissed reparations claims, a development that could signal the
death knell of all slavery reparations litigation.5
Why is the theory of reparations so divorced from the reality? It
seems that a disjunct exists between scholarly writing on reparations
and real world decisions.6 One source of this disjunct is the difficult
nature of establishing causation in reparations cases. This Article will
address the unique problems of causation and attenuation that arise in
the reparations context.

1181, 1182-85 (discussing statistics) [hereinafter Brophy, Cultural War]; see also
Lee A. Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery
Reparations, 33 U. Mem. L. Rev. 409, 410 n.9 (discussing these and other poll
results). See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial
Reconciliation in the United States, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 903, 915-19 (2003)
(discussing demographics of Americans opposed to reparations).
4
Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989);
H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Conyers has stated, “I
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so
until it’s passed into law.” John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations: The
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_ reparations.htm. See also Verdun, supra note
2, at 606-07 & n. 28 (discussing proposed legislation); Wenger, supra note 1, at 194
n.6 (same).
5
In re African-American Slaves Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 2d 721
(N.D. Ill. 2005). The Slave Descendants case was particularly important because it
was the first major reparations case in federal court in ten years. Previously, in the
only opinion by an appellate court dealing with reparations, claims against the
government were dismissed. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.
1995). Slave Descendants took a different tack, seeking compensation from private
rather than governmental actors. Both Cato and Slave Descendants are discussed in
more detail infra.
6
Cf. Brophy, Reparations Talk, supra note 1, at 83-86.
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Causation is a familiar concept to legal scholars. Tort liability
requires a showing of proximate causation.7 Claimants must show not
only conceptual “but-for” causation — that “but for” a party’s actions,
the harm would not have occurred — but must also establish legally
actionable “proximate cause.”8 In reparations cases, the attenuated
nature of the harm makes it difficult to show proximate cause.9
7

See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 69-72 (1975); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735, 1737-39 (1985).
8
See Elizabeth C. Price, Toward A Unified Theory of Products Liability:
Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1277, 1347 (1994)
(“‘Cause-in-fact,’ ‘factual cause,’ or ‘but for’ causation, as every first-year law
student knows, is generally an indispensable requisite to recovery in tort. It is the
first head of the two-headed hydra of causation. The other head . . .is ‘proximate’ or
‘legal’ cause, a policy tool designed to cut off liability for acts perceived as too
remote, attenuated, or mere conditions.”); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives
Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 Cal. L.
Rev. 683, 727 (2003) (“Actual causation is but a starting point for establishing
responsibility, making the causal agent ‘eligible’ for responsibility.”). W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 (1984) (“As a practical
matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposing liability.”).
Thus, the law generally treats as actionable those
“consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient
cause, from the original negligent act.” See 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 491.
“For such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he or she
could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow or results of a similar
nature.” Id. See also Keeton et al., supra, at 301-08 (discussing intervening causes);
Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts 86-87 (1986) (discussing proximate cause).
9
In the words of one critic, reparations advocates point to an injury which is
not “fairly traceable to slavery through a chain that contains no links of independent
causation.” Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations
for Slavery, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 157, 166 (2004); see also id. (“I am
contending only that the nexus between slavery and the present forces that produce
the sense of injustice felt by black Americans today is too attenuated to merit a
judicial award of damages based on restitution.”); see infra § I.B. (discussing
attenuation in reparations literature). For other examples of the attenuation
discussion in reparations literature, see, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving
Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. Third World
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Attenuation is diminished or failed causation.10 Attenuation is
typically created by a conceptual separation between two actors or
events, or a dilution or weakening of the conceptual connection
between the two. As such, attenuation severs theoretical “but-for”
causation from legally actionable proximate cause.
In this Article, I turn an analytical eye to attenuation arguments
used in the reparations debate, defining and examining different types
of attenuation arguments that arise in the literature. Attenuation
arguments as used in the reparations debate come in three types, which
I identify and classify for the first time: victim attenuation, wrongdoer
attenuation, and act attenuation. Victim attenuation is found in the
argument that modern Blacks11 have no direct connection to slaves;
wrongdoer attenuation, that modern Americans tend to lack specific
individual connections to slave holders; and act attenuation, that

L.J. 45, 52 (2003) (noting the problem of attenuation); Art Alcausin Hall, There is a
Lot to be Repaired Before We Get to Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying
Issues of Race That Impact the Fate of African American Reparations, 2 Scholar 1,
27-32 (2003) (noting recurrence of the attenuation defense); Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L.
Rev. 689, 708 (2003) (noting difficulty in connecting past wrongs to present harm);
James R. Hackney Jr., Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort
Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1193
(2004) (noting causation problems in reparations context).
10
“The longer the interval between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action, the more attenuated becomes the evidence of the requisite
causation.” Spadola v. New York City Transit Authority, 242 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see generally 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence §§ 465, 491 (1989 &
Supp. 2000) (discussing how temporal factor and an intervening circumstance affect
remoteness and causation analysis).
11
Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or
“African-American.” Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘‘African-American’ and ‘Black’
interchangeably. When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my
view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”).
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modern injury to Blacks is unrelated to the harms of slavery.12 After
defining terms and examining how attenuation arguments are used in
the slave reparations context, I then discuss concepts from mass torts
jurisprudence that could apply to the reparations debate.13
In the end, I seek to set out a framework for analyzing attenuation,
and to work through some of the major legal attenuation problems.
This Article will not address all possible attenuation concerns, but will
12

See infra Part I.A. (discussing victim, wrongdoer, and act attenuation).
Causation and attenuation concerns have thus far received little sustained
treatment in the reparations literature. A number of scholars have discussed concepts
of causation briefly. See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 9, at 739; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 735. However, the only
direct analysis of causation from the tort standpoint has been James Hackney’s short
essay, Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation and the
Case for Social Welfare Transformation. See Hackney, supra note 9.
Hackney’s analysis is similar in some ways to the analysis in this Article, and
provides a useful jumping off point. Hackney suggests different types of causal
problems, which are similar to the types of attenuation analyzed in this Article.
However, this Article differs from Hackney’s essay in many respects. This Article’s
classificatory scheme identifies the problems as stemming from attenuation, and
classifies them in a way that aids the analysis. This Article also discusses how tort
law has dealt with these types of attenuation, and sets out a series of suggested
applications that are beyond the treatment in Hackney’s essay.
This Article is also limited in its own scope. This article will primarily address
attenuation in reparation cases brought for the harm of slavery. Other reparations
cases, such as lawsuits brought for the Tulsa riots, present different questions of
causation and will not be discussed in any depth herein. See Keith N. Hylton, A
Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 31, 43 (2004)
[hereinafter Hylton, Framework] (“When thinking about reparations claims, one
should avoid the mistake of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties
in terms of identification of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of legal rights. In
fact, reparations claims vary along many legal dimensions, creating a rich array in
terms of their consistency with settled law.”); see generally Alfred L. Brophy,
Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of 1921 (2002) (giving background of
Tulsa riots). I will focus on individual reparations claims, rather than on claims that
might be brought by African nations seeking compensation for loss of citizens.
Finally, I will focus on claims derived from the harm of slavery itself, rather than
claims based on post-emancipation acts such as racism or segregation.
13
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address some major legal concerns, and will also set out a framework
for analyzing concerns.
I. Background
A. Types of Reparations Claims
Claims for slavery reparations encompass a number different of
legal theories, but the two major strands are tort and unjust
enrichment.14 The most straightforward type of claims are tort claims.
Slaves suffered many deprivations that could potentially trigger tort
liability.15 They routinely suffered harms including physical injury,
loss of property, lost wages, loss of liberty, loss of family relations,
loss of consortium, and mental anguish.16 Their descendants suffer
today from residual racism, a consequence of slavery.17

14

This is generally recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 516 (“As to substantive basis, the most commonly cited
bases are unjust enrichment and tort.”).
Other theories are possibilities. Some commenters have suggested bringing
human rights claims. For example, in provocative language the evokes the possibility
of a human rights claim, Randall Robinson suggests that slavery was “[a] massive
crime against humanity . . . an American holocaust.” Robinson, supra note 1, at 33.
And in another paper, I have argued that slave descendants could seek recompense
under the takings clause for taken self-ownership. Wenger, supra note 1. Despite
these and other intimations, the two dominant approaches in reparations thus far are
tort and unjust enrichment.
15
“Against the proper defendants, the idea of some kind of legal action
designed to punish and secure compensation seems not only sensible, but
compelling.” Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for
Slavery, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1405, 1417 (2004) [hereinafter Sebok, Two Concepts].
16
See Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84. B.U. L. Rev. 1209, 1213-37;
[hereinafter Hylton, Slavery] (discussing types of harms arising from slavery);
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1417; see also Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S.
Our Debts?, Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 Geo. L.J. 2531, 2534 (2001) (“The
wrongs done to African slaves during slavery, such as the physical capture and
exploitation of Africans for labor, the inhumane treatment and abuse of slaves by
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There are also some important conceptual obstacles to any tort
claim arising from slavery. For one thing, it is unclear whether slave
owners owed a legal duty to slaves. It is also unclear whether they
owed any duty to slave descendants.18 However, a colorable argument
can be made that either slave owners indeed owed a duty to slaves or
their descendants, or that they should have been aware that the regime
of slavery was legally dubious in a way that they should not be
surprised to be held to have owed a duty to slaves or their
descendants.19 For purposes of this Article, in order to focus on
causation issues, we will assume that slave owners either owed a duty
either to slaves or to their descendants, and that tort compensability of
slavery is not negated by its legality at the time.20
In addition to tort theories, reparations claims have been brought
under unjust enrichment theories. Unjust enrichment claims differ
from tort claims in significant ways. While a tort claim is a claim at
law arising from a breach of duty and a negligent or intentional harm,
an unjust enrichment claim is a hybrid claim in law and equity, and a it
requires a claimant to show only that a defendant unjustly obtained

white slaveholders, and the psychological abuses in failing to acknowledge and
respect African personhood, to name only a few, were horrible and unfathomable.”).
17
See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 1, at 224-26.
18
If there was no duty owed to either slaves or to future generations (or to some
other party harmed under slavery), then there is no tort claim. See Keeton et al,
supra note 8, at 301-20 (noting need to establish duty). In addition, if the duty owed
to a party is particularly weak, it could be viewed as affecting other aspects of tort
liability such as causation. See generally Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at
516 nn. 84-85 (discussing conceptual problems with tort liability for slavery).
19
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 1212 (arguing that slavery was a lawless
regime, and that “applying today’s law to [slavery] should be viewed as bringing law
to a regime from which it had been entirely displaced”).
20
Tort law routinely compensates victims of harm cause by acts which were
legal when performed, such as use of asbestos or Agent Orange, or provision of
tobacco or DES. See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 1212 (suggesting that
the legality of slavery undermines the legitimacy of the legal system of the time).
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some benefit from the claimant, which benefit should be refunded.21
The measure of damages is the amount of unjust gain.22 Unjust
enrichment claims provide certain tactical advantages in mass
compensation litigation and have been successfully used in Holocaust
and tobacco cases; they also may create particular tactical
disadvantages.23 Unjust enrichment claims have been brought in the
slave reparations context, though academics are divided as to whether

21

“The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust enrichment based on
quantum meruit are: (1) A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2)
an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the acceptance
or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value.”
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1427; see also Anthony Sebok, Reparations,
Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the
Two, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 651, 654-55 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, Knowing
the Difference] (further discussing unjust enrichment); Brophy, Some Problems,
supra note 1, at 521 (discussing arguments in favor of unjust enrichment reparations
compensation).
22
See Anthony Sebok, Prosaic Justice, 2002 Legal Aff. 51, 52 [hereinafter
Sebok, Prosaic Justice]; Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 1443, 1447-49 (2004).
23
Unjust enrichment claims are less susceptible to statue of limitations
defenses. See Sebok, Knowing the Difference, supra note 21, at 653; see also
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1418 (noting that states in the tobacco
litigation used unjust enrichment claims, since these are less susceptible to
affirmative defenses). They may have other tactical advantages. Sherwin, supra
note 22, at 1449-51.
Unjust enrichment was included in the Holocaust cases through a circuitous
route -- the case was originally a replevin claim, and restitution was later added as an
additional effective tool. Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1407. The
restitution claims ended up being central in the Holocaust settlement. See id.; see
also Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 52. Unjust enrichment claims,
however, are uniquely susceptible to equitable defenses. Sebok, Knowing the
Difference, supra note 21, at 655. In addition, they may be less morally compelling
than conventional tort claims. Id. at 657; Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at
52-53.
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they are appropriate in this area.24 Some scholars have suggested that
economic loss should be treated as non-descendible.25 This view is
contested, with others suggesting that economic loss claims ought to
be viewed as descendible.26 In any event, they are seen as practically
important; one commenter has argued that unjust enrichment is “the
only viable strategy remaining” for reparations advocates.27
In addition to the divide between tort and unjust enrichment
approaches, there is also a division in reparations between ancestorbased theories and descendant-based theories. That is, it is possible to
bring a claim focused on the harms done to the initial slaves (ancestorbased theories). It is also possible to being claims focused on the
harms which slave descendants continue to suffer today (descendantbased theories). (Of course, any particular litigant may seek to raise
both ancestor- and descendant-based claims.)
The two different focal points bring their own advantages and
disadvantages. An ancestor-based approach will have no problem in
showing harm -- it is undisputed that slaves were harmed, and a strong
case can be made for restitution to them.28 However, since no slaves
are presently alive, an ancestor-based approach encounters difficulties
24

Compare Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1440-42 (suggesting that
restitution for deceased persons such as slaves is not conceptually coherent and
should be avoided), and Sherwin, supra note 22, at 1454-65 (arguing that unjust
enrichment reparations claims are inappropriate because they rely on resentment and
retaliation) with Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery:
On Incomplete
Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. Rev.
1139, 1158-63 (arguing that restitution claims are descendible and appropriate in the
reparations context).
25
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1431-41.
26
Dagan, supra note 24, at 1158-64. One way to elaborate on Dagan’s theory
is to suggest that unjust enrichment claims brought for property loss, rather than tortlike claims, could be viewed as more easily passed from one generation to the next.
27
Sebok, Prosaic Justice, supra note 22, at 52.
28
See also Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favor of Former Slaves, 84 B.U. L.
Rev. 1277 (2004) (discussing cases of restitution to slaves found to have been
wrongfully enslaved).
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on remedies: Should a slave descendant receive remedies for harms
done to an ancestor?
A descendant-based approach elides that difficulty but runs into
the opposite problem.
Descendants will not have a problem
establishing that they are the proper recipient of a remedy -- if they can
first establish a harm done to them. But the descendant-based theory
suffers from difficult questions in establishing harm -- how are modern
slave descendants harmed by slavery?
Ultimately, each theory depends on the resolution of the same
difficult questions of causation, such as how slaves can be connected
to modern claimants.
B. General Principles of Causation
It is black letter law that a tort claimant must show causation in
order to establish liability against a defendant.29 However, the idea of
causation is often difficult to apply in particular cases. Well-known
conceptual problems may complicate any attempt to assign liability for
an act to a preceding “cause”30-- while an infinite number of factors
may be considered “but-for” or “factual” causes of a harm,31 only
some of those will be considered legally actionable causes, those
29

See Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263-67.
Every effect has multiple causes. Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-inFact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 62 (1956); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 1737 (noting
that there are innumerable causes for each injury); id. at 1780-85 (discussing tort
scholarship about multiple causes); Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 713-14 (causation is vague
and manipulable, more than a simple question of fact, and actual cause involves
policy questions just as proximate cause does).
31
Hart & Honoré, Causation in the Law 10-11 (1967); Keeton et al., supra note
8, at 266 (“Many courts have devised a ruled, commonly known as the ‘but-for’ or
‘sine qua non’ rule, which may be stated as follows: The defendant’s conduct is a
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct;
conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would
have occurred without it.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 90-91 (discussing but-for cause).
30
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which the law deems “proximate.”32 The determination of legal
causation depends in part on whether an initial event is necessary,
sufficient, or both, in the causing a second event.
In the most simple causative scenario, an initial event is both
necessary and sufficient to cause a second event. For example, David
might run into Louise with his car, causing her leg to be broken. The
causative event -- David’s collision with Louise -- is both necessary
and sufficient to cause Louise’s broken leg.
When a causative event is either not necessary or not sufficient to
create a second event, causation becomes more complicated. If an
initial event is not necessary, we say that causation is overdetermined.
In the classic example, two negligently set fires merge, and a property
is destroyed by the joint fire.33 Either fire, on its own, would have
destroyed the property, and so neither fire, taken individually, was
necessary to cause the end result. If Fire A had never been set, Fire B
would still have led to the result.
In contrast, if an initial event is not sufficient to bring about a
second event, we say that causation is underdetermined.34 Thus, in the
well-known case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, the initial event
32

Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 263 (“An essential element of the plaintiff’s
cause of action for negligence, of for that matter for any other tort, is that there be
some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the
damages that the plaintiff has suffered. This connection is usually dealt with by the
courts in terms of what is called ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause.’”); see also Gray,
supra note 8, at 85-91 (discussing proximate and but-for cause); Calabresi, supra
note 7, at 72-76 (discussing this difference).
33
Hart & Honoré, supra note 31, at 10-15.
34
See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 Conn. L. Rev.
1379, 1380 (2000) (“The problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we
don’t know if the defendant’s breach of duty caused the injury is because we don’t
know whether the victim was in a position to benefit from the increase in safety that
the duty was supposed to guarantee.”); see also Malone, supra note 30, at 65 (stating
that the process of determining causation is often “basically conjecture”); see
generally Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (1981) (discussing the
conceptual idea of underdetermination).
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(negligent handling a box) led to a chain of future events. The box
was dropped (a second necessary condition); the box contained
fireworks (a third necessary condition) which exploded; the explosion
toppled a set of scales (a fourth necessary condition), and finally the
plaintiff was harmed.35 We would say that normally dropping a box is
not sufficient to cause such a chain of events. Causation was found to
be underdetermined in Palsgraf, leading to a finding of no liability.36
Similarly, if a sailor falls off of a ship and drowns, and the ship did not
maintain adequate safeguards, it may be impossible to know if the
safety measures would have saved the sailor.37 The sailor may have
been swept overboard despite the precautions; the cause of his death is
underdetermined.38
Both underdetermined and overdetermined causation are
commonly found in the mass tort context. A defendant’s product may
not be necessary to cause a particular harm, making individual cases
overdetermined. Where the harm manifests in a physical disease that
can have many causes showing conventional causation can be
difficult.39 As Margaret Berger notes, harms for which plaintiffs seek
compensation may be “found in others who have not been exposed to
the substance or product in question.” Thus, “it is impossible to tell
whether an individual plaintiff’s injury is attributable to the product or
whether it would have manifested itself anyhow.”40 This difficulty
35

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 340 (1928).
Id.
37
Malone, supra note 30, at 76.
38
Malone, supra note 30, at 76; Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1379-82.
39
See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a
New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2123 (1997)
(“None of these categories of evidence is capable, however, of proving conclusively
a cause and effect relationship . . . Evidence of this kind is inherently subject to
considerable uncertainty and inconclusiveness.”); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in
Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96
Yale L.J. 376, 380 (1986).
40
Id. at 2121-22; see also Gold, supra note 39, at 376 (“Proving the cause of
injuries that remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and
36
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results from the number of causes that can contribute to a disease; as
another commentator notes, “rarely is any particular toxic agent the
exclusive source of a given disease. Insidious diseases generally have
several sources, each of which may be sufficient to bring about the
condition.”41
Underdetermination is also a concern, since a
defendant’s product may lead to disease only through interaction with
other acts or circumstances.42 Finally, mass torts typically involve a
large number of plaintiffs harmed by a defendant’s product. Some of
their cases may involve simple causation, while others may have
underdetermined or overdetermined causative chains.
With this brief background in causation, we can now turn to the
specific case of reparations for slavery.
II. Three Types of Attenuation in Reparations
In the reparations context, many different types of arguments are
often raised to challenge the idea of causation. Such arguments use
the language of attenuation. These attenuation arguments can be
divided up in a way that helps us analyze them. Some of these
arguments impact directly on the causation analysis, while others are
less directly related.
In this part I examine these attenuation arguments that arise in
discussions of reparations. Much of this Part is descriptive, setting out
various attenuation arguments as they have been used by others. This
Part is also classificatory, in that it will place specific statements into
occur at background levels even without any apparent cause, is the central problem
for toxic tort plaintiffs.”).
41
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public
Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 856; see also Jack B.
Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 148-55 (1995) (discussing this
problem); Robinson, supra note 30, at 759 (stating that a deterministic causation
approach that assumes a clean relation between an act and the injury is not useful in
indeterminate cases which require probabilistic evidence).
42
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30, at 759-60; Rosenberg, supra note 41, at
850-56; Berger, supra note 39, at 2123-30.
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one or more categories. Section A will discuss act attenuation, Section
B will discuss victim attenuation, and Section C will examine
wrongdoer attenuation.
Attenuation arguments in reparations have three major thematic
strands. These are victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation, and act
attenuation. These interrelated but distinct components correspond to
a perceived lack of connection between deceased slaves and present
claimants (victim attenuation); between slave beneficiaries (slave
holders and governments) and modern citizens or governments
(wrongdoer attenuation); and between harmful acts of slavery and any
present injury.43
43

Some other writers have noted the presence of some of these general themes
in reparations. See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“There are, then,
several distinct problems between connecting past and present. There are problems
in connecting the past wrongdoers with their successors (who would be the present
defendants); problems in connecting past victims with their successors (who would
be the present plaintiffs); and connections between past wrongs and present
claims.”); see also id. at 503-04 (“The claims are hard to fit into a traditional
framework for two reasons. First, the victims are making claims against people who
are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that defendant class may not have any
current benefit from the harm. In that case, there will be a claim asserted against a
discrete group of innocent people. . . . Often the perpetrators cannot be identified
with specificity or are no longer alive.”); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social
Responsibility and African American Reparations: Jubilee, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 309,
365 (2003) (noting that opponents of reparations focus on specific difficulties
including “the absence of directly harmed individuals,” “the absence of individual
perpetrators,” and “the lack of direct causation”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9,
at 698 (“Reparations claims thus involve three relationships: (1) the relationship
between the original wrongdoer and the original victim; (2) the relationship between
the original wrongdoer and the possible payer of reparations; and (3) the relationship
between the original victim and the possible claimant or beneficiary of reparations.
The claimant must show that each relationship is of the proper type.”); id. at 699
(“Compensatory justice requires a relationship of identity between the wrongdoer
and payer and a relationship of identity between the victim and claimant.”); Verdun,
supra note 2, at 628-30 (“Opponents of reparations to African Americans argue that
living whites have not injured living African Americans; the wrongs of slavery were
committed by individuals who have been dead for years. African Americans to day
were never slaves, and are not entitled to wages for slave labor performed over one
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A. Act Attenuation
The first type of attenuation argument that arises in reparations is a
standard kind of attenuation which I will here call act attenuation —
the idea that there is no direct connection between past wrongdoing
and present harm. Act attenuation is not unique to reparations, but is a
common theme in much of tort litigation. For example, Palsgraf, with
its unique chain of events leading to the ultimate injury, gives an
example of act attenuation.44 Act attenuation may be created by
overdetermined or underdetermined causation. Act attenuation is an
attack on the move from conceptual cause to proximate cause.45
Act attenuation is also a common objection to slavery
reparations.46 One critic notes that a “problematic consideration is

hundred years ago.”); Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 39-40 (discussing
different types of claims and distinguishing them based on whether injurers and
victims are identifiable).
Little of the existing scholarship discusses the significance of these different
variants of attenuation, or seeks to classify and analyze these divisions, as I do in this
Article. The closest analogue is James Hackney’s analysis in his recent essay. See
Hackney, supra note 9, at 1195-97 (discussing “identification, boundary, and source”
causation issues). However, Hackney’s analysis, which is briefer than the discussion
and analysis in this Article, differs from my analysis in several respects. Hackney’s
essay uses a preliminary discussion of some causation issues to frame an analysis
that focuses on social welfare discussions. In contrast, this Article focuses on the
causation concerns themselves, and how they could be addressed by using
conceptual tools from the mass torts context.
44
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).
45
See generally Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 266.
46
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 1, at 9; Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at
518-19. Attenuation not a special or uniquely high hurdle to forestall reparations
claims, though they may be unusually susceptible to this defense. Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 9, at 711. Attenuation is a familiar bugbear for civil rights
advocates.
See Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s
Desegregation Opinions, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 69, 90-95 (1992) (noting Supreme
Court use of attenuation to rule against desegregation claims).

16

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

causation, which invokes the question of whether the injury presently
complained of was a foreseeable product of the defendant’s conduct. . .
. it is necessary to wrestle with the issue of whether that past conduct
has caused injury to a contemporary plaintiff.”47 This objection is easy
to understand. It can be difficult, after all, to connect the harms of
slavery to specific disadvantages of Blacks today. Indeed, it is not
easy to characterize Blacks as a cohesive economic group at all. There
are vast differences in wealth, status, and class among individual
Blacks.48 Some individuals appear to have integrated smoothly into
society, while others have not.49
The difficulty of unraveling potential contributing or ameliorating
causes leads to act attenuation. Thus, a “lack of sufficient connection
between past wrong and present claim” is an argument that Matsuda
calls one of the “standard doctrinal objections to reparations.”50
Similarly, media and pundit statements discuss act attenuation.51 A
There is certainly no agreement by reparations advocates that proximate cause
is not satisfied. Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 123-25; Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 8, at 728-33 (arguing that chain of proximate causation has not been
broken by actions of slave descendants).
47
Massey, supra note 9, at 162-63.
48
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375. Of course, despite these differences, Blacks
are overwhelmingly less well-off than whites. See generally Robert Westley, Many
Billions Gone, Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L.
Rev. 429, 471-72 (1998) (same).
49
As Mari Matsuda notes, “Not all members of the victim group are similarly
situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some feel betrayed, others do not. Some are
easily identifiable as group members, others have weak claims to membership.”
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375.
50
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 373-74. Matsuda’s other standard objections are
“factual objections and excuse or justification for illegal acts; difficult identification
of perpetrator and victim groups; [and] difficulty of calculation of damages.” Id.;
see also id. at 374 (“The problem of specific identification of wrongdoers and
victims is a common objection to reparations.”).
51
Horowitz writes that reparations is “based on the unfounded claim that all
African-American descendants of slaves suffer from the economic consequences of
slavery and discrimination” and that “no evidence-based attempt has been made to
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number of critics suggest that shortcomings of Blacks, individually or
as a group, are responsible for any present injury.52
Act attenuation relates affects the cases not only at trial or motion
stage, where it affects a showing of tort causation. Act attenuation
also has important indirect effects on claimants’ very right to press a
claim. Courts only allow claims by those who can show standing -that is, a direct connection between a wrongful act and a claimant’s
injury.53 Act attenuation is a factor in standing inquiry; as the
Supreme Court has stated, a relevant question in deciding standing is,
“Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too
attenuated?”54
Act attenuation is a normal obstacle that arises in many cases, not
just those involving reparations. Many claimants bring cases where
causation is either overdetermined or underdetermined. In particular,
those kinds of issues often arise in mass compensation cases, where a
connection between initial acts and resulting harms may not always be
clear.
Some conceptual tools exist to deal with the problem of act
attenuation. For example, unjust enrichment claims may elude act
attenuation, because unjust enrichment depends only on a showing that
a defendant was unjustly enriched.55 In addition, some scholars
prove that living individuals have been adversely affected by a slave system that was
ended over 150 years ago.” Horowitz, supra note 58, at 6.
52
See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 8, at 728-33 (discussing these arguments); see
also Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 35-37 (discussing differences in Black
and white family structure).
53
See id. at 380-81 (“The linkage of victims and perpetrators for acts occurring
in the immediate past is another trait of standard legal claims.”); see also Brophy,
Some Problems, supra note 1, at 505 (“Closely related to the difficulty of
identification of victims and wrongdoers is the requirement that there be a close
connection between past wrong and present claim.”); Verdun, supra note 2, at 624
(noting this requirement in affirmative action). This is a common theme in tort law.
See, e.g., F.R.C.P. 23 (setting out commonality requirement in class action lawsuits).
54
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
55
See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1416-17.
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suggest that courts are likely to overlook act attenuation concerns in
certain cases, such as those involving personal injuries.56 However,
the general route for overcoming act attenuation is a factual one, and
claimants generally overcome the problem by showing evidence of
causal links.
Act attenuation is an important theme in any discussion of
reparations. In addition to the standard act attenuation concerns that
arise in reparations, intergenerational mass harm claims such as slave
reparations involve two more specialized variants of the lack of
causation argument which I will address in turn.
B. Victim Attenuation
The first of the two more specialized concerns is what I will call
victim attenuation. Victim attenuation is the idea that modern
claimants are insufficiently linked to original harmed parties. This
lack of connection creates victim attenuation, a concern which is
typically present only in intergenerational claims. Victim attenuation
concerns arise not only in slavery reparations cases, but in others that
seek compensation for intergenerational harms, including cases
involving harms to Native Americans, Holocaust victims, and
Japanese internees.
In the slavery context, victim attenuation manifests in the argument
that Blacks today are not sufficiently linked to slaves, and are thus
undeserving of any recompense for slavery.57 The basic idea
underlying this concern is intuitive. Blacks living today were not
directly subject to the harms of slavery.58 Many Blacks may be slave
56

Id. at 1439-41.
A related concern is that slave descendants today would not exist but for
slavery, and therefore are not entitled to recompense. See, e.g., Stephen Kershnar,
The Inheritance-Based Claim to Reparations, 8 Legal Theory 243, 247-51 (2002).
58
“Opponents also argue that African Americans today were never slaves and
did not directly experience the injustices of slavery and its effects and thus are not
entitled to any form of reparations.” Hall, supra note 9, at 30; see also Brophy, Some
57
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descendants, but many others are more recent arrivals who lack that
connection as well.59 Present claimants are not original victims, and
may have a relatively low proportion of descent.
This concern appears in the literature on reparations. Stephen
Kershnar argues that modern Blacks have only “token” rights of
reparations because they are not sufficiently connected to slaves.60
Keith Hylton suggests that reparations claims must be treated as
derivative claims under tort law, which means that as a practical matter
they will most likely fail.61 Al Brophy notes that “[f]ormulating a
legal claim . . . involves linking past victims with people who are
making a claim in the present—or what one might call present victims
of past discrimination.”62 And media critics of reparations for slavery
also emphasize victim attenuation.63

Problems, supra note 1, at 518-20; Miller, supra note 9, at 52; David Horowitz, Ten
Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea for Blacks - and Racist Too,
Front Page Magazine, January 3, 2001.
59
See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 9, at 739; Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1063, 1064 (1968) (noting difficulties in identifying plaintiffs); see also Linda
Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in The Affirmative Action Debate 314, 314-22
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (noting victim attenuation concerns relating to
affirmative action); Verdun, supra note 2, at 623 (discussing victim attenuation in
affirmative action); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 712 (same).
60
Kershnar, supra note 57, at 251-58; see also Janna Thompson, Historical
Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendants, 112 Ethics 114, 116-21
(2001) (suggesting that the passage of time precludes reparations).
61
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 38-45.
62
Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504.
63
For example, one critic argues that “it is obscene to think of this modern
generation of black Americans profiting from the blood money drawn nearly 140
years ago from the exploitation of slaves.” Juan Williams, Slavery Isn’t the Issue,
Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2002. See also Adolph Reed, On Reparations, The
Progressive, December 2000 (noting difficulty of connecting modern victims with
slave ancestors); Merida, supra note 2, at C-01. Merida notes that “Opponents say
there is no precedent for paying people who are dead, that reparations are usually
awarded to survivors.” Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
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Victim attenuation concerns have been paramount in judicial
decisions on reparations. Victim attenuation directly affects the legal
analysis of a claimant’s standing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Cato v. United States, dismissed reparations claims
brought against the government, stating that:
Cato proceeds on a generalized, class-based grievance;
she neither alleges, nor suggests that she might claim,
any conduct on the part of any specific official or as a
result of any specific program that has run afoul of a
constitutional or statutory right and caused her a
discrete injury. Without a concrete, personal injury that
is not abstract and that is fairly traceable to the
government conduct that she challenges as
unconstitutional, Cato lacks standing.64
Similarly, the district court in the recent In re African-American
Slave Descendants Litigation decision dismissed a number of
consolidated claims in related cases brought against corporations.65
The court wrote that:

64

70 F.3d at 1109-110. The court elaborated, “she does not trace the presence
of discrimination and its harm to the United States rather than to other persons or
institutions. Accordingly, Cato lacks standing to bring a suit setting forth the claims
she suggests.” Id.
65
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 2d 721
(N.D. Ill. 2005). That consolidated case proceeded under a different theory than
Cato; it was brought not against the government but against corporations whose
predecessor entities had benefited from slavery. Despite this difference, the issue of
standing again proved decisive. The court initially dismissed claims in January
2004, giving leave to replead. See In re African-American Slaves Descendants
Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004). In July 2005, the amended
complaint was dismissed, in a substantially similar opinion. 375 F. Supp. 2d 721;
see Anthony Sebok, “The Lawsuit Brought by African-Americans Seeking
Compensation from Corporations for the Wrongs of Slavery: Why the Opinion
Dismissing the Suit is Unpersuasive,” Findlaw (August 8, 2005) [hereinafter Sebok,
The
Lawsuit]
(available
online
at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050808.html) (noting similarity between the
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Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is derivative of the injury
inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a
century ago. . . . This is insufficient to establish
standing, and contrary to centuries of well-settled legal
principles requiring that a litigant demonstrate a
personal stake in an alleged dispute. . . . Plaintiffs
cannot establish a personal injury sufficient to confer
standing by merely alleging some genealogical
relationship to African-Americans held in slavery over
one- hundred, two-hundred, or three-hundred years
ago.66
Plaintiffs had sought to establish standing by arguing that they
were slave descendants, and claiming that, as the rightful heirs of their
ancestors’ assets, they suffered injury because their ancestors were not
compensated for their labor.67 The court disagreed: “Plaintiffs’ claim
to the economic wealth of their ancestors’ labor is conjectural. While
most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their
ancestors’ wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption.”68 In
addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the
requirements for third party standing: “Plaintiffs have not alleged a
legally sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is

2004 decision dismissing the original complaint and the 2005 decision dismissing the
amended complaint).
The case was dismissed in part because of standing and attenuation issues, and
in part because of the statute of limitations. 375 F. Supp. 2d at 770-80 (discussing
statutes of limitation); id. at 775-80 (discussing exceptions to the statute of
limitations); see generally Robinson, supra note 43, at 366-68 (discussing statutes of
limitations); Wenger, supra note 1, at 244-48 (same).
66
Id. at 748, 751.
67
Id. at 748.
68
Id.
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a genealogical relationship, and more is required under the law in
order to confer third-party standing.”69
The difference between victim and act attenuation is subtle. While
act attenuation is an assertion that a claimant has suffered no legally
cognizable harm, victim attenuation is an assertion that the claimant is
a person who should not bring a claim at all. In the context of
descendant-based reparations suits, victim attenuation asserts that
modern claimants are insufficiently linked to harmed parties, thus
relying on act attenuation -- the lack of a connection between a tort
inflicted on a slave and any perceived present day harm. In the context
of slave based reparations, victim attenuation is not dependent on act
attenuation but rather on the intergenerational gap itself and on the
idea that modern claimants are not good representatives of slaves, who
may have themselves once had colorable claims. Thus, concerns of
victim and act attenuation are interrelated. Victim attenuation
problems of standing exist because courts are unsure that current
claimants can show a harm to them. The same perceived inability to
show harm would inevitably create act attenuation concerns at any
trial. (However, a weaker connection between victims and harm may
satisfy the victim attenuation standing concerns, while a stronger
connection might eventually need to be shown to establish causation at
trial.)
Victim attenuation defenses potentially apply to both tort and
unjust enrichment claims. Victim attenuation has arisen in both sides
of the Slave Descendants litigation, for example. And both types of
claims have foundered in court, due at least in part to victim
attenuation. (Conceptually, to the extent that victim attenutation is an
outgrowth in part of act attenuation, then unjust enrichment claims –
some of which are less subject to act attenuation -- may also be less
susceptible to victim attenuation defenses.)
69

Id. at 753. As the court noted, the requirement is that the party asserting third
party standing show some injury in fact, and that that party also show that prudential
considerations weigh in its favor. Id. at 752-53.
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C. Wrongdoer Attenuation
The third type of attenuation argument is wrongdoer attenuation.
Wrongdoer attenuation exists because present-day citizens and
governments may not be closely connected to slave owners, suggesting
that perhaps they should not be required to pay for harms caused by
slavery.70 Many modern non-Blacks are not descendants of slave
owners, and have no apparent direct connections to them.71 All living
70

See Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 (“The people who
perpetrated the crimes of slavery are gone and their estates are (mostly) distributed.
A few corporations survive and some of the money made from slavery is traceable to
currently existing bank accounts. However, there are significant problems in
imposing the liability of past generations of private actors on the current
generation.”); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 375 (“Of those taxpayers who must
pay the reparations, some are direct descendants of perpetrators while others are
merely guilty by association. Under a reparations doctrine, the working class whites
whose ancestors never harbored any prejudice or ill-will toward the victim group are
taxed equally with the perpetrators’ direct descendants for the sins of the past.”);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 736 (“Reparations are rarely paid by the
original wrongdoers, that is, the individuals who performed the wrongful acts,
whether or not on behalf of a state or corporate body. Substantive moral
considerations must explain why nonwrongdoers—usually taxpayers or
shareholders—should pay reparations; when these considerations fail, prudential
considerations must be invoked.”); Hall, supra note 9, at 30 (“White America today
attempts to distance itself from both the ‘sins of slavery’ and of its forefathers, in an
effort to deny responsibility for the past and present problems associated with race.
Opponents of African American reparations contend that slavery and past injustices
by White Americans were not conducted by individuals living today, but rather by
individuals long dead.”).
71
This is recognized in the reparations literature. See, e.g., Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 519; Verdun, supra note 2, at 629-30; Miller, supra note
9, at 52. And many modern Americans may not feel any sort of link to slave owners.
However, based on casual observation, there seems to be at least some degree of
connection that many white southerners feel for former slaveholders. This can be
seen, for instance, in the detailed civil war role-playing activities; the continued
prevalence of statues of confederate generals; the politically popular use of the
confederate flag; and the resurgence of historical societies such as the Daughters of
the Confederacy. Reparations opponents may be more connected to the past, and in
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defendants are a generation or more removed from slave owners.72 In
addition, it is likely that most or all slave owner descendants have at
least some ancestors that were nonslaveholders – and many are mixed
descendants who have ancestry traceable both to slaveowners and to
slaves themselves.73 All of this serves to greatly complicate the task of
apportioning blame to living defendants. Thus, Vincene Verdun sums
up the concepts underlying wrongdoer attenuation as follows:
From the dominant perspective, it would be patently
unfair to make all white people or society pay for
slavery because that would necessarily include people
who did not participate in the wrong. These people
include whites who are descendants of abolitionists and
nonslaveholders, and immigrants, or descendants of
immigrants, who came to this country after slavery was
abolished; post slavery immigrants cannot be connected
with a wrong associated with slavery.74
particular to the slave-owning past, than they tend to admit in discussions about
liability. See Jason Zengerle, Lost Cause, The New Republic, August 2, 2004, at 14
(discussing popularity of Confederate reenactment and historical groups); see also
Carter Davis, Race and Reparations, Alabama City magazine, April 24, 2004,
available
online
at
http://www.al.com/news/citymagazine/index.ssf?/base/news/1082801701197890.xm
l, at 5 (noting concerns raised by opponents about the “legacy” of the University of
Alabama when professor Al Brophy suggested the university investigate its slave
owning past).
72
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1419-20.
73
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 740 (“The more difficult problem
exists when the wrongdoing occurs on a large scale, and the wrongdoers and victims
miscegenate, or their descendants miscegenate. A descendant of a victim might
therefore also be the descendant of a wrongdoer. With sufficient mixing, reparations
become pointless. It makes no sense for a person to pay reparations from one pocket
to the other. Even with more limited mixing, one must grapple with the question
whether to treat people differently on the basis of how many ancestors belong to the
class of victims and how many belong to the class of wrongdoers.”).
74
Verdun, supra note 2, at 630; see also The Conversation, Wash. Post, July
23, 2000, at F1 (“As a white woman, I am tired of being blamed for slavery
because—and only because—I am white, when the fact of the matter is I am
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Wrongdoer attenuation undercuts the moral force of reparations
arguments, which are often presented as a demand for justice.75
Wrongdoer attenuation arguments may take the form of statistics, such
as noting the number of people who have arrived in the country since
1865, the percent of the populace descendant from post-bellum
immigrants, and so forth.76
While victim attenuation may evoke the possibility of an
unjustified windfall, wrongdoer attenuation brings the image of an
unjustified penalty.77 That is a strongly negative image to overcome in
a society which places high value, at least rhetorically, on the
protection of the innocent.78 As Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
descended from Irish and German immigrants who didn’t arrive on Ellis Island until
well after the Civil War.”) (statement of Peggy Sakagawa); Massey, supra note 9, at
162. Brophy notes that legal liability “requires linking past perpetrators with people
who currently exist.” Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 504.
75
Reparations advocates often use the language of culpability in reparations
literature, though there has been some recent movement towards a less
confrontational tone. See Miller, supra note 9, at 49-52 (arguing that reparations
advocates have created problems by being unnecessarily confrontational); see also
Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 519 n.94 (“My point is that in talking about
reparations for slavery and Jim Crow, one must be careful in talking about claims of
victims against perpetrators, when many of the people against whom claims are
being asserted are not perpetrators.”); Alfred Brophy, Taking Reparations Seriously,
(Unpublished Manuscript), at 16 (“For many reparationists, the focus is upon past
harm as a way of arguing for reparations. Among others there seems to be little
interest in reconciliation. But those voices are not the leaders in the field. They do
not represent the most thoughtful reparationists.”). See generally Lee A. Harris,
Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations, 29 Southern L. Rev. 25 (2001); Lee A.
Harris, “Reparations” as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33
U. Memphis L. Rev. 409 (2003).
76
See Horowitz, supra note 58, at 3-4.
77
See Jeremy Waldron, Superceding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics 4 (1992), at
26-27 (noting these concerns). In addition, reparations opponents sometimes suggest
that past acts, such as the civil war, constitute sufficient payments for slavery. See,
e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 730-31 (noting this argument); Horowitz,
supra note 58, at 9.
78
Verdun, supra note 2, at 620-22.
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note, “a strong tradition in the United States holds that individuals are
not blameworthy for acts over which they have no control.”79 Group
sanctions are an exception.80
Wrongdoer attenuation has played a part in derailing proposed
reparations legislation. Representative Henry Hyde, then-chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, argued that “the notion of collective guilt
for what people did [200-plus] years ago, that this generation should
pay a debt for that generation, is an idea whose time has gone. I never
owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don’t know that I should
have to pay for someone who did [own slaves] generations before I
was born.”81 The political wrongdoer attenuation argument is couched
in the moral language of wrong and right, rather than in legal
language.82 Similar moral-inflected arguments are used by many
prominent media critics of reparations.83
79

Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 699; Daryl Levinson, Collective
Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 347-48 (2003); Brophy, Some Problems, supra note
1, at 548 (noting that American law typically ties legal liability to moral culpability).
80
In instances where group sanctions are tolerated, it is often as a form of
deterrence, see id. at 348-49, and such consequentialist justification would not apply
to the case of reparations for slavery. See Massey, supra note 9, at 165 (noting that
reparations have no deterrent value); see also Levinson, supra, at 347-48 (noting that
Blacks have been subjected to collective sanctions in the past).
81
See Merida, supra note 2, at C-01; see also 136 Cong. Rec. S1312-03,
Statement of Sen. Bumpers (Feb. 21, 1990) (stating that “I am a son of the South.
But I never owned a slave. My father never owned a slave” in arguing that modern
Turkey should not be blamed for the Armenian genocide).
82
See Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and
African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 477, 496-97 (1998) (discussing political
component of reparations arguments).
83
For example, Armstrong Williams criticizes the reparations movement for
“seek[ing] to penalize our current government for what white slave holders did
centuries ago.” Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in Should America Pay?,
supra note 1, at 165, 167; see also id. at 170 (noting conceptual difficulty in
assessing reparations against post-bellum immigrants). John McWhorter argues that
some “obvious retorts” to the idea of reparations include “that many whites in
America today arrived after emancipation [and] that many whites owned no slaves.”
John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in Should America Pay?, supra note 1, at
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Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation is not strictly a
causation argument. Rather, it is an attack on the identity of the party
against whom a claim is made. And like victim attenuation, it may be
used in tandem with more traditional act attenuation arguments.
However, unlike victim attenuation, it is not limited to cases of
intergenerational harm. “You got the wrong guy, judge,” is a standard
line of defense in many cases. And wrongdoer attenuation intersects
with other kinds of attenuation, including act attenuation, in various
ways.84

191. David Horowitz has stated that reparations are inappropriate because “only a
tiny minority of white Americans ever owned slaves” and “most [modern]
Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to slavery,” among other reasons.
Horowitz, supra note 58, at 1. This article was widely distributed and received
nationwide attention. See Brophy, Cultural War, supra note 3, at 1201. Michelle
Malkin writes that reparations advocates seek payments from “the U.S. government,
which means American taxpayers, which means tens of millions of people who had
nothing remotely whatsoever to do with inflicting such injustice on anyone.”
Michelle Malkin, Get Out Your Reparations Calculator, TownHall.com, August 15,
2002,
available
online
at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michellemalkin/mm20020815.shtml .
Other, less oppositional voices have also wondered about these concerns. Kevin
Merida, a relatively sympathetic Washington Post reporter, frames the potential issue
as: “Why should American taxpayers who never owned slaves pay for the sins of
ancestors they don’t even know? And what about those whose ancestors arrived here
long after slavery ended?” Merida, supra note 2, at C-01.
84

One strain of wrongdoer attenuation argument is similar to the idea of
overdetermination. That is, modern parties can assert the wrongdoer attenuation
argument that “Even if my ancestor had decided to pay his slaves, the generalized
harm to slave descendants would have taken place anyway.”
This is an overdetermination argument, similar to saying that “since a hundred
other people also poisoned the well, my own act of poisoning the well should not be
viewed as causative of decedent’s death.” Thus, it is similar to the legal doctrine of
substantial factor (that is, that a defendant is not liable unless her acts were a
substantial factor in causing a harm). See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing substantial
factor). This kind of argument, while internally consistent, lacks the moral force of
most wrongdoer attenuation arguments.
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The strength of wrongdoer attenuation arguments will vary with a
number of factors, primarily the party against whom a claim is
asserted. Thus, this line of defense can be partially avoided though
smart lawyering. Many reparations claims are brought against
corporations, and these corporate entities may in fact be the same legal
entity as that which originally harmed slaves. Because this step avoids
wrongdoer attenuation, many reparations cases involve such long-lived
entities.85 But that move, while lessening wrongdoer attenuation, can
increase act attenuation, since the particular corporate entity against
whom suit is brought may be removed from direct participation in
harmful acts. (There are exceptions to this general trend. For
example, Holocaust litigants bringing suit against Ford Motor
Company for its use of slave labor avoided both wrongdoer attenuation
– the company was the same entity – and act attenuation, since the link
between the act and the harm was clear).86
Like victim attenuation, wrongdoer attenuation may be a less
compelling defense against claims of unjust enrichment. This is
because unjust enrichment claims are not based on the guilt of a
particular defendant, only on a showing that he has been enriched.
Despite this theoretical advantage, wrongdoer attenuation concerns
were voiced by the Slave Descendants court as it dismissed reparations
claims, noting that “the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link
these Defendants to the alleged harm”87 and that the “Complaint is
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named
85

There are conceptual questions about the validity of corporate punishment
over time, since the burden falls on shareholders who were not owners of the
corporation at the time the wrong occurred. See generally John C. Coffee, No Soul
to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Enquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 Michigan Law Review 386 (1981) (discussing theoretical
problems with punishing corporate entities).
86
See generally Michael Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the
Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 204-06 (2000) (discussing
Ford litigation)
87
Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
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Defendants or their predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their
ancestors.”88
D. Recap
These three types of attenuation are used, often together, to suggest
that reparations for slavery would not be appropriate. These critiques
are not unique to the case of Black slavery, and similar arguments
apply in most or all reparations-type actions.89
The problem of attenuation arises repeatedly in the literature.
Many commenters suggest that attenuation fatally undercuts the case
for reparations. Such an assessment reflects judicial reality at present.
The Slave Descendants court based parts of its opinion on all three
types of attenuation. It mentioned wrongdoer attenuation — “the
allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint do not link these Defendants to the
alleged harm”90 — and act attenuation — “Plaintiffs’ complaint is
devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the Defendants
was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs complain.”91
In particular, the Slave Descendants court, like the Cato court, focused
on victim attenuation — “Plaintiffs cannot establish a personal injury
sufficient to confer standing”.92 Thus, the problems of victim,

88

Id. at 740.
See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 372 (discussing attenuation defense in
connection with reparations claims by Native Hawaiians); see also Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 9, at 699-711 (noting these types of objections to reparations
generally).
90
Id. at 749 (emphasis added). The Court also wrote that the “Complaint is
devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defendants or their
predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors,” wrote the court. Id. at 740.
91
Id. at 750.
92
Id. at 748-51; see also id. at 1067-68 (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to connect
any alleged injury of any one of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors to alleged conduct by
any one of the Defendants or their predecessors. . . . [T]he allegations in a complaint
must be those relating to the plaintiff, not those of someone else.”).
89
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wrongdoer, and act attenuation certainly have been decisive in
derailing reparations suits in court.93
III. Effects
The presence of all three kinds of attenuation creates a particularly
difficult hurdle for reparations. Attenuation concerns operate in legal
and moral arenas to create doubts about the viability of any judicial or
legislative progress towards a reparations settlement.94
93

Other reparations cases in the courts have largely followed the reasoning of
Cato without further discussion. See Bell v. United States, No. Civ. A.
301CV0338D, 2001 WL 1041792, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Aug.31, 2001) (citing Cato in
holding that plaintiff lacked standing); Bey v. United States Department of Justice,
No. 95 CIV 10401, 1996 WL 413684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same);
Langley v. United States, No. C 95-4227, 1995 WL 714378, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Nov.30,
1995) (same); see also Himiya v. United States, No. 94 C 4065, 1994 WL 376850,
*2 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 1994) (citing Cato in dismissing on sovereign immunity
grounds).
94
Attenuation concerns are manifested in two different spheres. First,
attenuation comes up in the moral sphere, with concerns that it is somehow wrong
for reparations to be paid by those who are not connected to slavery. Cf. FordeMazrui, supra note 8, at 685 (discussing moral arguments about reparations and
affirmative action). Second, attenuation arises in the legal sphere, with objections
that reparations cannot for legal reasons be paid to plaintiffs who lack standing, or a
more direct connection to the slaves who were harmed. See, e.g. supra sections II.A
through II.D (discussing the legal effects of attenuation).
These are opposite sides of the same coin. Massey, supra note 9, at 157
(“When grappling with providing reparations for slavery, two distinct categories of
issues emerge: legal and political.”). And just as the idea of reparations is based on a
joint legal and moral argument, attenuation provides a joint legal and moral counterargument. See Miller, supra note 9, at 50 (“Reparations, on this account, involves a
demand for restoration of the ill-gotten gains of slavery to the group that was
wronged. In so doing, it suggests both a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling
moral argument. The legal strategy requires us to identify the various ways that
blacks were harmed by whites who profited from slavery and then to sue for the
repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some central fund for more
general disbursement. The moral argument asserts that whites as a group were, and
continue to be, responsible for the ills of the African American community. It is the
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It is often suggested in the reparations literature suggests that
successful resolution of slave reparations litigation may be a natural
extension of other successful mass litigation, such as restitution to
Holocaust victims or Japanese internees.95 However, it is significant
that there is no major success story in mass litigation that has
overcome the presence of all three kinds of attenuation.
In particular, the Holocaust victim cases did not involve the level
of victim attenuation present in slave reparations. As Bert Neuborne,
who helped lead the Holocaust restitution effort, writes, “the
Holocaust cases dealt with a first-generation effort” to return
“identifiable property from the unjustly enriched owner of the property
to its true owner or a close relative.”96 Thus, the Holocaust lawsuits
did not suffer from the same levels of victim attenuation that plague
slavery reparations suits. The settlement provided limited recovery for
heirs of very recently deceased class members, but nothing nearly on
the level that slave reparations would require.97 The Holocaust
power and simplicity of that moral claim that makes reparations at once so
compelling an argument and so difficult for the vast majority of whites to endorse.”);
cf. Yamamoto, supra note 82, at 518 (“Those seeking reparations need to draw on
the moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while
simultaneously radically recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits
those harmed and generally furthers some larger interests of mainstream America.”).
95
See, e.g., Brophy, Some Problems, supra note 1, at 499-500 (“A second
factor leading to the reinvigoration of talk about reparations for slavery and Jim
Crow laws are the models of reparations that other groups -- Native Americans,
Holocaust victims, Japanese Americans interned during World War II, South
Africans -- have obtained.”).
96
Bert Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation, Lessons for the Slavery
Reparations Movement, 58 NYU Ann. Surv. Am. L. 615, 621 (2003); Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 512 (noting that Holocaust recompense claims differ from
slave reparations because “there are quite specific claims for identifiable property or
specific torts.”).
97
See Madeline Doms, Compensation for Survivors of Slave and Forced Labor:
The Swiss Bank Settlement and the German Foundation Provide Options for
Recovery for Holocaust Survivors, 14 Transnat'l Law. 171, 199 n.204 (2001) (noting
provision for distribution to heirs of class members who are deceased, but only for
those who die after the settlement date).
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litigation also avoided wrongdoer attenuation by focusing on existing
governments and corporate entities.98 Thus, the litigation arguably
only suffered from one type of attenuation, act attenuation.
Neuborne notes this difference, writing that largely due to
attenuation problems, “the lines of identity have become so blurred” in
slave reparations, “today’s remedy may be more political than legal.”99
That assessment alone does not mean that reparations litigation is
fruitless. The reparations movement, like the Holocaust compensation
movement before it, is composed of “an untidy mixture of law,
politics, and raw emotion.”100 In the Holocaust cases, legal claims did
not prevail qua legal claims, but rather allowed advocates to keep the
public eye on the issue until defendants chose to settle.101
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that the Holocaust litigation,
which many advocates see as a model for slave reparations, differs
significantly in its vulnerability to attenuation arguments.
Other successful mass restitution cases are no more encouraging.
The claims brought on behalf of Japanese internees did not suffer from
victim attenuation. The claimants were the same people who had been
interned.102 Similarly, the massive tobacco litigation, which resulted
in a settlement, did not suffer from the same attenuation problems.103
The tobacco companies were the original harming parties, and the
claimants were the original victims. Significantly, in some strands of
related tobacco litigation that did introduce victim attenuation
concerns, the cases were dismissed. For example, qui-tam-like claims
98

See generally Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1406-10 (discussing
the litigation history of the Holocaust cases).
99
Neuborne, supra note 96, at 621.
100
Id. at 619.
101
Id. (“The litigation was as much about politics as it was about law . . . . Law
provided the roadmap [for settlement], but did not necessarily provide the fuel.”).
102
See Hylton, Framework, supra note 13, at 32-33; Dale Minami, JapaneseAmerican Redress, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 27 (2004).
103
Some reparations advocates have suggested that the use of restitution theory
to extract a settlement in the tobacco cases is a possible model for reparations. See
Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1406.
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under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which suffered from
conceptual separation similar to victim attenuation, were eventually
dismissed.104
Indeed, the cases that have manifested all three kinds of
attenuation are most striking for their failure to achieve a satisfactory
resolution. Cases involving claims brought on behalf of Native
Americans are similar to reparations cases, in that they involve victim
attenuation, act attenuation, and wrongdoer attenuation. These cases
have not generally been successful.105 No generalized tort- or humanrights-based action for crimes against Native Americans has
succeeded. Where Native American redress claims have succeeded, it
has been on the basis of treaties signed with individual tribes. (Of
course, no such treaties exist in the slave context). Indeed, it is not
overstatement to say that no case which suffered from all three kinds of
attenuation has successfully proceeded to a successful resolution
through trial or settlement. This is a dire diagnosis for reparations.
It is questionable exactly how many types of attenuation can be
present in a case before the case collapses. Obviously, one type alone
can be fatal in some cases. But can a case ever succeed if it faces three
types of attenuation? This is unclear. It may be possible to address
one or more kinds, such as through efforts by reparations advocates to
address wrongdoer attenuation by bringing suit against corporate
entities. But as noted in that discussion, that solution only increased
act attenuation. Is it possible to deal with all three types at once? That
is the challenge that reparations advocates face, and it is a primary
reason that reparations claims are failing today. Because of the
presence of all three kinds of attenuation, it is not clear that reparations
104

Claims under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act were brought to collect for
tobacco-related expenses of patients paid by Medicare. See Mason v. American
Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp.2d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing these claims).
105
See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and
Reparation: 1830-1976 The United States Government's Role in the Promotion,
Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans,
51 DePaul L. Rev. 911 (2002).
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litigation can ever succeed. If it does, it will be a trailblazer, the first
case to succeed facing all three kinds of attenuation. It is sobering to
note that only by overcoming attenuation in a truly unprecedented
manner could reparations cases succeed in court.
Ultimately, however, reparations cases may not be best suited for
success in court.106 Most of the major cases that reparations advocates
often seek to emulate, including the Holocaust litigation, tobacco
litigation, and suits for Americans of Japanese Ancestry, succeeded
not through judicial fiat but through negotiated settlement.107
Successful emulation of that model means keeping a court case alive,
in order to keep up consistent legal pressure while moral and political
arguments are brought to bear. However, that court case need not
ultimately be a legal winner itself. The key for reparations at this
juncture is to continue to advance ideas, particularly ideas that could
counter the thorny problems created by attenuation.
IV. Using the Tools of Mass Torts to Address Attenuation in the
Courts
It is very surprising that, despite the profound analogy between
attenuation and similar concerns that come up in mass tort, there has
been very little discussion thus far of how to apply mass tort concepts
in the reparations context.108 Courts and scholars have addressed
106

Many reparations advocates candidly admit that reparations are unlikely to
be awarded at trial, and that the most fruitful route is legislative act or some sort of
settlement Westley, supra note 48, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly
state legislatures, that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, Some
Problems, supra note 1, at 534-39 (noting need for development of dialogue and
scholarship to address the possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note 9, at 51-57
(suggesting that settlement is more likely to be successful than litigation); Wenger,
supra note 1, at 256-58 (same).
107
See Sebok, Two Concepts, supra note 15, at 1405-16 (noting history of
tobacco and Holocaust litigation).
108
The major exception is Hackney, supra note 9, which briefly discusses some
of these concepts.
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complicated issues of causation in the mass tort context. Indeed,
slavery itself can be viewed as one of the earliest mass torts.
In this Part, I will explore the analogy between reparations and
mass torts. I do this as follows: Section A will discuss some of the
issues of causation that arise in the mass tort context, and Section B
will examine similarities between causation issues in mass torts and in
reparations.
A. Similarities Between Reparations Concerns and Mass Tort
Concerns.
Using the terminology developed in Part II of this Article, we can
see how attenuation relates to the previously examined categories of
attenuation. It is evident that the problems of attenuation that affect
mass torts have much in common with those that plague reparations
lawsuits. Mass torts present the same concerns of victim, wrongdoer
and act attenuation.
In both cases the real problem is the same. There is a potential
connection between claimants and payers, but it is of undeterminable
strength. It is hard to match the victim to the wrongdoer, and to match
the parties to the harm.
In fact, many mass tort issues could be reframed, using the
categories of attenuation we have previously discussed. For example,
the problems of tracing a particular cancer to a defendant’s product are
created by act attenuation. The problem of identifying a culpable
defendant from among a pool who have manufactured fungible
products in a large market is a problem of wrongdoer attenuation. And
the problem of connecting a harm to children and grandchildren of the
originally harmed party — the so-called “DES granddaughters” — are
problems of victim attenuation. In addition, the causation problem
related to the victim attenuation concern of standing.
For example, the different types of attenuation are visible in the
litigation surrounding the drug diethylstilbestrol, better known as
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DES.109 DES was a drug commonly given to pregnant women over a
period of time, and it ultimately proved to have deleterious effects on
many of the children of those women.110 Litigants in the many strands
of DES litigation faced victim attenuation defenses, since the
daughters and granddaughters of women who took DES brought
claims for harms done to them. (Ultimately, the litigants with the
biggest victim attenuation problem, DES granddaughters, did not have
great success in court). Litigants also faced wrongdoer attenuation
problems as in some cases it was difficult to trace DES pills to a
particular manufacturer. Finally, litigants faced act attenuation
concerns as they sought to link their harms to the drug (though for
DES litigants, act attenuation was not a big hurdle as causation was
established early for some harms). The mass tort issues as mapped
onto an attenuation grid would follow along these lines: Wrongdoer
attenuation is similar to difficulties in tracing harm to a specific
tortfeasor111; victim attenuation is similar to tracing harm to later
victims, particularly in cases such as the DES granddaughters; and act
attenuation is similar to the problem of linking harm to a defendant’s
actions.
As in the mass tort context, the harm to modern slave descendants
caused by of slavery is of underdetermined causation. Like the case of
ships and safeguards, like in the case of DES granddaughters or Agent
Orange veterans, we cannot know if a defendant’s alternate choice not
to enslave would have resulted in greater assets being given to any
particular slave descendant. Since reparations presents a problem

109

See Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement: Guardian of
Fairness or Obstacle to Justice? Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1071, 1071-81 (1991) (discussing DES litigation).
110
Id. (collecting sources).
111
Also, issues of wrongdoer attenuation may arise in addressing successor
liability for damages. See generally Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 17 (1986) (discussing theoretical successor liability issues).
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analogous to mass torts, it is helpful to see how courts have addressed
these issues in the mass torts context.
B. Addressing Attenuation in Mass Torts
Tort law in general, and mass torts in particular, has developed
means of dealing with underdetermination. While uattenuation ed
causation may complicates the legal inquiry, it does not altogether rule
out a finding of legal causation. This Section will discuss how tort law
has dealt with attenuation. Loss of chance will be discussed in Section
1, burden shifting in Section 2, market share liability in Section 3 and
substantial factor in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 will focus on the use
of statistical evidence.
1. Loss of Chance
The tort system allows recovery in some underdetermined cases.112
A useful example is the imposition of liability for those ships that did
not adequately protect against being washed overboard. In a wellknown law review article, Wex Malone studied these cases and found
that courts moved from a policy of not imposing liability to a policy of
imposing liability nearly all of the time.113 Significantly, courts were
willing to impose liability despite the conceptual difficulty of not
knowing whether the victim would have been in a position to benefit
from the increase in safety.114 “It would be futile for the courts to
recognize a duty to provide emergency equipment and to impose an
obligation to proceed promptly to the rescue if the defendant could
always seize upon the uncertainty which nearly always attends the

112

73.

See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381; Malone, supra note 30, at 72-

113

Malone, supra note 30, at 75-77.
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1380; Gray, supra note 8, at 97-100 &
n.18 (discussing cases).
114
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rescue operation as a reason for dismissing the claim,” noted
Malone.115
Tort scholars have suggested various theoretical approaches
explaining why courts should allow liability even where causation is
underdetermined. Wex Malone refers to many of these cases as
involving the loss of a “gambler’s chance.”116 In such cases, a
defendant facilitates the realization of an independently created risk.117
Courts are not always willing to find liability in gambler’s chance
cases, however, and are most willing to find liability in cases where a
defendant had notice of a potential harm.118 Similarly, courts are more
willing to find liability where defendants violated a rule “designed to
protect” against the harm that in fact occurred.119 The gambler’s
chance lost by slave descendants is likely to be quite substantial. 120
2. Burden Shifting
Burden shifting is also efficient, in many cases where is is
impossible to show either causation or non-causation.121 Summers v.
Tice is the classic case involving a hunting accident where it was
impossible to determine which of two negligent shooters had caused
the injury.122 The court held that “practical justice” allowed the
115

Malone, supra note 30, at 75-77.
Id. at 80; see also Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381. The loss of the
gambler’s chance can be a significant loss; in many instances, without a defendant’s
actions, “some value would have been preserved.” Malone, supra note 30, at 80.
117
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1383. See also id. at 1383-84 (giving
examples); Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 435, 439-48 (1999).
118
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1385-86.
119
Malone, supra note 30, at 72.
120
Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39, suggests that descendants might have
an approximately forty percent chance of inheriting excess wealth from four
generations removed. Id. at 39.
121
Robinson, supra note 30, at 721-26; Gray, supra note 8, at 117-18
(discussing burden shifting).
122
Id. at 715; 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948). The court ruled that both hunters
could be held liable. Id.; see also Malone, supra note 30, at 83 (stating that the court
116
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burden to shift to defendants, to establish that they were not the cause
of harm.123
A similar approach appears in some mass tort cases. The court in
Bichler v. Eli Lilly, a DES case, noted:
There have been several approaches in tort law
available to a plaintiff confronted with more than one
actor who could be the causation in fact. In such
instances where each such party acted independently
but tortiously and it is proved that injury has been
caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is
uncertainty as to which one caused it, and where each
can be joined as a defendant in the case, some courts
have shifted the burden of proof of causation in fact to
the defendants.124
That court also found that since defendants had acted in a similar
manner, and were aware of the possibility of harm, they could be held
liable, even if the harm could not be directly traced to one particular
defendant.125 Other DES courts have also adopted some version of
group liability.126 This is similar to the idea of “enterprise liability,”

was unwilling to let “two wrongdoers pass the ball”); Keeton et al., supra note 8, at
271 (“It seems a very desirable solution where negligence on the part of both
defendants is very clear, and it is only the issue of causation which is in doubt, so
that the choice must be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof fall on
the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendants.”); Gray, supra note 8, at 102-04
(same).
123
33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-88 (1948).
124
Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 324-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
125
Id. at 325-26.
126
See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984); see generally
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1483-97
(1986) (discussing several DES cases). This development was also rejected by some
courts. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386, Mass. 540 (1982).
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which was applied in other mass tort settings to find that all actors in
an industry are liable for foreseeable harms.127
On DES granddaughters, courts have divided in those cases, with
some courts allowing DES granddaughters to pursue claims against the
DES manufacturers, and other courts barring these claims.128 The
burden shifting used by some DES courts is dispositive, since typically
defendants are as unable to disprove causation as plaintiffs are unable
to prove it.129
Scholars have suggested that courts are most likely to shift
burdens, either explicitly or implicitly, and find liability in
underdetermined causation cases where certain other factors are
present. For example, courts are more willing to find liability if the
tort is an intentional tort, or if its harm is easily foreseeable.130 Courts
may reject cases where the chance of harm is particularly low.131 And

127

See, e.g., Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
128
See id. at 251-61 (discussing cases); DeMayo v. Schmitt, No. 625, 1989
Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 73, at *1 (C.P. Philadelphia County Dec. 28, 1989)
(allowing claim for negligence to be stated); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E. 2d
198 (N.Y. 1991) (claim could not proceed because of preconception tort doctrine);
McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1985) (permitting third
generation claim); Bowe v. Abbott Laboratories, 608 N.E. 2d 223 (Ill. App. 1992);
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E. 2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (denying recovery); see
generally Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 Tenn. L.
Rev. 315, 320-28 (discussing the cases).
129
Robinson, supra note 30, at 729.
130
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1381; Malone, supra note 30, at 73, 8587.
131
See Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1387 (noting that the lower the
probability that defendant’s act was not a cause, the higher the probability of a court
imposing liability); see also id. at 1387-90 (discussing the difficulty of dealing with
low probabilities in a world of full compensation). The conceptual problem is that a
court may be faced with two unpleasant choices: either to overdeter, or to allow
defendants to escape liability entirely. Id.
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they may be likely to find liability where a party engaged in
particularly noxious acts.132
3. Market Share Liability
Market share liability is a unique application of burden shifting.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories used burden shifting, holding defendant
DES manufacturers liable unless they could show that they did not
cause plaintiffs’ harm.133 The court held that since multiple actors
contributed to the harm, and causation was not individually traceable,
all of the potential contributors could be held responsible.134 Sindell
has been called “modified Summers” case because it allowed
defendants to pay in proportion to the harm they caused.135 The court
adopted reasoning similar to Summers, noting that “as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of the injury.”136
4. Substantial Factor
Courts may apply the “substantial factor” test, allowing liability in
cases where a defendant’s actions were a substantial factor leading to
the plaintiff’s harm.137 A defendant’s actions will be considered a
substantial factor in causing a harm if they “satisf[y] the but-for test
132

See id. at 1386 (suggesting that the very production of handguns carries
culpability); Rabin, supra note 117, at 453 (noting that handguns are designed for a
dangerous purpose).
133
Id. at 717; see 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The court
opted to make the DES manufacturers show that they did not cause the injury, rather
than making the victims show causation. Robinson, supra note 30, at 714-15. The
court adopted this position in part because it was easier for defendants to maintain
the kind of data that could be used to either show, or disprove, causation. Id. at 734.
134
Id. at 729.
135
Gray, supra note 8, at 105-06.
136
26 Cal. 3d at 610-11.
137
Malone, supra note 30, at 89-95 (discussing the substantial factor test).
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(with an exception for simultaneous independent sufficient causes)
[and are] an appreciable and continuously effective or efficient factor
in producing the harm, up to the time of occurrence of the harm.”138
The substantial factor test allows courts to decide whether there is
close enough affinity for the law to intervene and label a defendant’s
conduct “wrong.”139
Another useful analysis of substantial factor causation can be
found in the district court opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, which
dealt with a class action suit against handgun manufacturers for the
harms caused by negligent distribution of handguns.140 The court asks
whether a defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in
the development” of a harm or “a substantial factor . . . increasing the
probability” of plaintiffs’ harm.141 The underlying inquiry, as
suggested by commentators, was “if defendants had behaved
differently, how many fewer plaintiffs would have been harmed?”142

138

Wright, supra note 7, at 1781-82; see also Robinson, supra note 30, at 751
(noting that the substantial factor test is similar to the but-for test). One benefit of the
substantial factor test is that it prevents minor causes from creating liability. Id. at
715-16.
139
Malone, supra note 30, at 72.
140
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
141
62 F.Supp.2d at 838.
142
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1403-04. The judge noted that the
defendants’ conduct was a “significant contributing factor in the development” of the
ultimate harm. 62 F.Supp.2d at 838. The evidence, wrote the court,
was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the
negligent marketing and distribution of handguns by manufacturers
was a substantial factor in the promotion and development of an
underground illegal market supplying New York criminals, and
thus increasing the probability of death or serious injury [to
plaintiffs].
Id. On the jury’s role in assessing punishment, see generally Kaimipono David
Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 Wisc. L. Rev. 1115, 114856.
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The substantial factor test can be a useful tool to allocate liability
in cases involving overdetermined causation. Where a number of
factors could each have created a harm, substantial factor analysis can
be used to differentiate which factors should be held legally liable.
5. Statistical Evidence
Faced with a variety of difficulties in showing causation in mass
tort cases, advocates, scholars, and courts have developed methods for
showing causation through statistical evidence. Scholars have argued
that a “probabilistic approach to causation” is proper in cases where a
large number of plaintiffs have been harmed by a group of defendants,
and where intervening causation is possible, resulting in inability to
definitely trace any individual plaintiff’s injury to an individual
defendant’s actions.143 In these cases, scholars suggest that the amount
recovered should be based on a “probability of causation” for a
defendant.144
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein suggested that plaintiffs would
divide any recovery to reflect the statistical increase in likelihood of
harm they suffered.
To address a complex problem of
underdetermination, Judge Weinstein applied statistical causation,
143

Robinson, supra note 30, at 759-60; Gold, supra note 39, at 384 (noting that
mass tort cases rarely involve particularistic evidence); Wendy Wagner, Note, TransScience in Torts, 96 Yale L.J. 428, 433 n.28 (collecting cases); Mario J. Rizzo &
Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory,
80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980) (advocating the use of probabilistic causation in
multiple cause cases).
144
Id. at 749-66; see also Bush, supra note 126, at 1490-92; Jack B. Weinstein
and Robert Kushen, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, C-607 ALI-ABA
Course of Study, July 24, 1991, at 709, 724 (“Statistical data may . . . permit
combinations of anecdotal and valid statistical data to prove guilt or establish some
material proposition of fact.”); but cf. Wright, supra note 7, at 1827 (suggesting that
such devices may result in the tort system becoming more of a wealth redistribution
system and less of a corrective justice system, and that such a change would be
unfortunate).
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using a type of proportional liability in allocating damages.145
Statistical, pro rata distribution of damages was used because of the
problem of indeterminate defendants and indeterminate plaintiffs.146
Recognizing the relative novelty of this approach, the judge wrote:
“We are in a different world of proof than that of the archetypical
smoking gun. We must make the best estimates of probability that we
can using the help of experts such as statisticians and our own
common sense and experience with the real universe.”147
The court’s analysis is instructive. Judge Weinstein noted that it
was quite possible that no particular plaintiff would be able to trace her
injuries to a particular defendant, and that only statistics would show
any harm at all. He illustrated such a scenario:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a
population of 10 million persons exposed to their product.
Assume that among this population 1,000 cancers of a
certain type could be expected, but that 1,100 exist, and
145

In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
see also Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial (1986) (describing trial and
resolution, including process of arriving at settlement).
146
Id. at 840-43. The court later wrote that causation could not be established
to allow liability. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment to defendants against plaintiffs
who had opted out of certified class, since plaintiffs could not show a “causal link
between exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases from which they are
allegedly suffering”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); In re “Agent Orange” Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (also granting summary judgment
against an opt-out plaintiff), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
147
Id. at 838; see also In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation,
52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Causation in toxic torts normally comprises two
separate inquiries: whether the epidemiological or other scientific evidence
establishes a causal link between c (asbestos exposure) and d (colon cancer), and
whether plaintiff is within the class of persons to which inferences from the general
causation evidence should be applied.”); Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 859-60
(advocating proportional liability for defendants “in proportion to the probability of
causation of harm” to the plaintiff class members). But cf. Wright, supra note 7, at
1822-23 (arguing that mere statistics, even when based on causal generalizations,
cannot adequately show legal causation).
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that this increase is “statistically significant,” permitting a
reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the
product of the manufacturers.148
In such a case, Weinstein recognized, “no plaintiff can show that his or
her cancer was caused by any one of the defendants.”149 The Agent
Orange case was a clear instance of the underdetermined causation that
is so common in mass torts. Similar concerns have dogged lawsuits
seeking compensation for harm caused by products such as tobacco,
asbestos, and DES.
These concerns were also particularly acute in the DES
litigation.150 DES was a drug which was used widely over a twentyfour year period, until it was found to cause reproductive illness in
children of pregnant women who took the drug.151 DES was
manufactured by a variety of companies, and many different types of
DES tablets, made by different manufacturers, were interchanged
freely.152 They were fungible products. Not only was it difficult to
determine whether plaintiffs’ injury arose from DES; it was also
difficult to trace the harm to any particular defendant.153 In most
cases, claims were brought by daughters of women who ingested DES.
In some cases, claims were brought by granddaughters of the women
as well.154 Statistical evidence was employed throughout the DES
litigation to show a likelihood of harm to plaintiffs, thus establishing
causation.155 Statistical evidence has been used in a variety of other
148

In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id.
150
See Russell, supra note 109, at 1080.
151
See generally Robinson, supra note 30, at 713-17.
152
Id. at 722-26.
153
Id.
154
See generally John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES Claims, 27
New Eng. L. Rev. 241, 285 (1992).
155
Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause,
18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1217, 1219-22 (1996); see also Brook, The Use of Statistical
Evidence of Identification in Civil Litigation, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 293, 327-28
(1985).
149
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mass restitution contexts. These include litigation related to tobacco,
asbestos, Benedictin, and other products.156
Statistical causation in mass tort cases is generally shown by the
use of epidemiological studies.157 These are used to “determine
whether there is a statistical association between defendant’s product
and plaintiff’s disease by comparing the incidence of disease in those
exposed to defendant’s product with the disease’s background rate.”158

156

As summarized by one scholar:
One way the causal link was made in the tobacco cases was the
introduction of statistical methods of proof. Plaintiffs in the
tobacco litigation were allowed to show that a widely distributed
product increased the aggregate number of state residents who
contracted a disease; such as lung cancer. In fact, this method of
proving causation seems to be widely accepted in cancer-related
cases. . . . In toxic-tort cases involving exposure to the drug
Bendectin, as well as silicone, herbicides, and asbestos, courts
have allowed statistical evidence to demonstrate causation where
direct proof of causation was lacking.
See Angela Lipanovich, Smoke Before Oil, 35 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 429 463-64
(2005) (citations omitted).
157
Epidemiology is the branch of medical science that employs integrated use
of statistics to “to identify and establish the causes of human diseases.” See
generally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732, 736 (1984). As one writer notes:
The hallmark of epidemiology is that it is based on the study of
populations, not individuals. It seeks to establish associations
between alleged causes and effects by one of two methods: either
comparing the incidence of disease across exposed and unexposed
populations, or comparing the incidence of exposure across sick
and healthy populations. With proper scientific interpretation,
these correlations lend great weight to an inference of causation.
Gold, supra note 37, at 380.
158
Berger, supra note 39, at 2125-26; see also Gold, supra note 39, at 384
(discussing phenomena of increased risk and enhanced probability of harm).
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V. Application to Attenuation in Reparations
The same tools used in the mass tort context can be used to address
legal attenuation concerns in reparations. We will examine each type
of attenuation here.
A. Tort Claims
1. Act Attenuation
Overcoming act attenuation requires showing a link between the
harm done to slaves and the harm to modern slave descendants. As in
the mass tort context, statistical analysis can be one very helpful tool
in showing this link. Other tort concepts like substantial factor can
also play a role in showing a legal link between slavery and current
harms.
Slave descendants could show a link between harm to slaves and
later harms suffered by slave descendants, through the use of statistical
evidence on the economic effects of slave descent.159 The alleged
harm to slave descendants is economic loss. It should be possible to
establish whether slave descendants as a group have a lower rate of
economic prosperity than the general populace. (In particular, it would
probably be helpful, if statistically possible, to compare prosperity
levels of slave descendants against those of control groups, such as the
descendants of free Blacks.) A study could show that slave
descendants as a group currently enjoy some ascertainable level of
prosperity. Applying statistical tools, slave descendants could then
seek to show whether, absent slavery, they would have attained a
greater level of prosperity. It should be possible to put a number on
this difference.
159

Cf. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1404, 1409 (suggesting that novel
cases particularly benefit from the use of statistical data). Of course, such a study
may be complex and difficult to perform. See Berger, supra note 39, at 2127-28
(noting the difficulty of conducting epidemiological studies).
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The existence of such a gap seems likely, given the well-known
economic disparities between Blacks and members of other races.160
Statistical evidence could serve to put a number on that gap. Such
application would probably involve, to adapt the language previously
used by Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation, an
examination along these lines:
Let us assume . . . a population of 10 million persons
exposed to [slave descent]. Assume that among this
population 1,000 [persons below the poverty line] could be
expected, but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is
“statistically significant,” permitting a reasonable
conclusion that 100 [persons below the poverty line] are
due to the [slave descent].161
Similar analysis could be done for various degrees of prosperity,
allowing reparations advocates to put a solid number on the question
of just how slaves’ lost property and lost wages affect their
descendants today.162 Adapting language from torts, slave descendants
could thus show that that slavery was a substantial factor in
determining their prosperity level, and that compensation is therefore
appropriate.
Reparations advocates can also point to existing cases to suggest
that slavery is the type of harm where burden shifting may be an
appropriate response to underdetermination. The harms inflicted
under slavery were intentional, not negligent, which is one indicator of
potential liability.163 The harm, against slaves and their children, was
also foreseeable, another potential indicator of liability.164 Negative
effects on a victim’s children are a logical result of severe

160

See supra note 48 (noting these statistics).
In re “Agent Orange” Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
162
It is possible as well that statistics will weaken the case for reparations, for
example, by showing that the harm to slave descendants is not as great as envisioned.
163
Twerski & Sebok, supra note 34, at 1385-86.
164
Id. (foreseeability of harm).
161
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wrongdoing.165 The very act of slavery carries an “air of culpability”
which some commentators suggest is another indicator of liability.166
Other factors also weigh in favor of liability: Slaves were subjected to
inhuman treatment,167 and an argument can be made that slavery was a
valueless act.168
2. Victim Attenuation
Tort concepts also address victim attenuation concerns. Loss of a
chance doctrine provides a conceptual hook to show harm to plaintiffs.
And statistical evidence could be used to demonstrate concrete harm to
slave descendants, overcoming the standing hurdle and eventually the
causation hurdle.
The conceptual underpinning for overcoming victim attenuation is
simple enough. It is certainly true, as the Slave Descendants court
notes, that any number of eventualities could have deprived plaintiffs
of receiving economic benefits from their ancestors. The plaintiffs’

165

To the extent that slave owners knew that they were harming slaves’
children, note Posner and Vermeule, it may be unreasonable to view victim
attenuation as an obstacle, because slave descendants were a knowable victim
themselves of slave owner wrongdoing. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 700.
See also Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 884-85 (“But one could just as easily describe
the defendant’s duty in aggregative terms as a duty extending from the defendant to a
class — the exposed population. . . . The defendant’s wrongdoing inflicts loss on the
exposed population as a whole.”).
166
Id.; see also Wenger, supra note 1, at 202 n.34 (noting argument that slavery
was a violation of natural law); Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery
Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of
Interpretation, 28 Pac. L.J. 977, 988-1014 (1997).
167
See Malone, supra note 30, at 95 (noting that “inhuman treatment” was a
factor in court finding causation).
168
See id. at 86 (noting that courts are more likely to find causation if harmful
act is not valuable to society); but cf. Wenger, supra note 1, at 238-40 (noting the
economic value of slavery to the country).
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ancestors may have chosen to spend their wealth on themselves169 or
donate it to charity. They may have chosen to give it to certain
favored children, and plaintiffs’ particular lines of parentage might
have been unrepresented. Even if plaintiffs’ ancestors had fully
intended to pass on their wealth, they may have been unable to do so.
They may have needed assets to deal with daily expenses or
emergencies, and had no money to pass on. They may have been poor
money managers, losing their assets in unwise investment.170 They
may have been victims of the many financial uncertainties that the
country has seen, losing money to market crashes, business
competition, changing laws, wars, speculation, financial panics,
currency fluctuation, and inflation.171
Every one of these is a possibility. And yet, it is also possible that
these ancestors, had they been paid for their labor, would have passed
down some amount of wealth, which would have eventually come to
the plaintiffs.172 This is not an unrealistic scenario; many Americans
169

This is a reasonable possibility. There is no indication that plaintiffs intend
to pass on parts of any recovery to their descendants, rather than simply consuming
it. See also Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39 (“Precariousness would have given
the slave a strong incentive to spend his money on his own desires right away.”).
170
See id. (“The problem that remains is the passage of time, which allows for
many opportunities for money to be squandered or used in other ways.”).
171
Sherwin, supra note 22, at 1445 (“The passage of time and the countless
human acts and choices that have intervened lead to daunting problems in tracing
injury to current generations of African Americans, and separating the harm of
enslavement from the effects of more recent public and private acts.”).
172
And, as with other tort cases, the supposed breaks in the causal chain of
harm to slave descendants are not particularly debilitating. In particular, the court is
concerned that it cannot verify that slave ancestors would have given their assets to
their descendants. This concern is overstated, given that bequeathing assets to
descendants is the normal course of events. Hylton, Slavery, supra note 16, at 39
(“In order to avoid reducing damages to descendants for a reason that was not only
beyond the slave’s control but a foreseeable consequence of the initial injury, we
should assume that if paid, he would have passed the money on at the same rate as
parents in conventional families do.”). But cf. Waldron, supra note 77, at 10 (noting
“whimsical” nature of property disposition).
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enjoy some measure of inherited wealth.173 It is unrealistic to suggest
that none of the slave descendants would have received inherited
wealth. And therein lies the kicker – slave descendants can indeed
show that they suffered a concrete harm, namely the loss of a chance.
While they cannot show that they would ultimately have been the
recipients of assets, this inability exists only because they never got the
chance to receive assets in the first place. The lost chance suffered by
slave descendants is a real and concrete harm. Showing the statistical
likelihood of inheritance answers the recurring critique that the amount
of compensation is not calculable.174
Statistical evidence can be used to show just how great of a chance
slave descendants lost. Slave descendants will need to show the
statistical likelihood of present claimants receiving wealth from slave
ancestors, as well as the likely amount of any inheritance. This
number should be calculable. Armed with such a number, slave
descendants can assert to a judge that they are not merely showing a
genealogical relationship; by depriving their ancestors of
compensation, slave owners deprived the slaves’ descendants of a
statistically measurable sum.175 Despite the possibility of intervening
173

See generally Thomas M. Shapiro, The Hidden Cost of Being AfricanAmerican: How Wealth Perpetuates Inequality (2004) (discussing transfer of wealth
between generations); Westley, supra note 48, at 440-45 (discussing economic
disparities between Blacks and whites).
174
See Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev.
1177, 1184 (2004) (“We have no idea of how much of that profit (assuming that it
could be calibrated) actually descended to the next generation. The ordinary
business will reinvest some share of its profits, but will declare some as dividends
and pay some out in salaries to its employees. Any dividends and wages do not
descend to the next generation.”); Massey, supra note 9, at 164-65 (“It is impossible
to know how much better off today’s black Americans would be, if at all. It is even
more speculative to try pinning a number on the loss suffered by any given
contemporary individual descendant of American slavery.”).
175
This number may be smaller than commentators assume. Indeed, economic
studies suggest that, absent the presence of legal regimes to preserve wealth, it is
difficult to keep fortunes together. See generally John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of
Idle Proprieters”: Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 Wash.
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causes, plaintiffs have some statistically measurable, non-negligible
chance of being the recipients of their ancestors’ wealth.176 (And it is
almost certain that reparations defendants could not establish that they
were not the cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.)
Even incomplete or preliminary statistical evidence should be
enough to overcome the standing issue that proved fatal in Slave
Descendants. The but-for connection between slavery and eventual
harm to slave descendants is not in doubt; the only question is exactly
how much worse slave descendants have fared compared to control
groups. A court could apply loss of a chance doctrine, taking judicial
notice that but for slavery, slave descendants today would enjoy
greater prosperity. That admission, coupled with basic statistical
evidence, could be used to show the level of harm required for
standing.
The standing analysis reflected in the current Slave Descendants
opinion is questionable and should be reconsidered.177 The court’s
standing analysis imposed on plaintiffs an unnecessarily high
hurdle.178 Even reparations critics found the court’s standing analysis

& Lee L. Rev. 167 (2001) (discussing the effect of fee tail and primogeniture in
preserving wealth between generations). Ironically, Blacks missed out on many of
the devices, such as fee tail and primogeniture, designed to maintain wealth. Thus,
principles of corrective justice suggest that they should be given the benefit of every
doubt on whether they would have kept wealth and passed it on to future generations.
176
Of course, the question might be complicated by the potential need for a
Daubert-approved statistical model in order to show standing.
177
See Sebok, The Lawsuit, supra note 65, at 1-2; Epstein, supra note 174, at
1179-81; Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations
Lawsuits, 20 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 91, 93 (2004).
178
In particular, the court may be requiring a showing of proximate cause,
when all that is really required is a showing of but-for cause. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on The
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1984); Calabresi, supra note 7,
at 71-73 (discussing the difference between “three conceptions of ‘cause’: ‘causal
link,’ ‘but for cause,’ and ‘proximate cause’”); see also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B.
Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
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flawed; the court’s decision is “little more than a disguised ruling on
the merits,” suggested one critic.179 The Slave Descendants court
suggested that proximate causation must be fully established to show
standing. That idea, however, goes against the law and the literature in
this area.180

Causation, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 607 (suggesting that courts generally insist on too
high a burden of causation).
Prior to Lujan, standing could sometimes be established under rather attenuated
theories of causation. “The [Supreme] Court has not . . . required a showing of strict
tort causation in the sense that the complained of conduct be the but-for cause of the
plaintiff’s harm. To the contrary, the Court has been willing to accept quite
attenuated theories of causation, at least at the pleading stage.” Karl S. Coplan,
Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 22 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 169, 185 (1997).
Lujan applied a less forgiving eye to the standing requirement. However,
Lujan did not alter the basic inquiry. 504 U.S. at 560-61. In addition, Lujan sets
forth a factual requirement to establish standing at the summary judgment stage, see
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Lujan stated that “at the pleading stage, general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim.” Id.
179
Epstein, supra note 174, at 1179-81. Courts are often accused of using
standing to dodge serious issues. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 166
(1992); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1009 (2002);
Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2239, 2251-52 & n.63 (1999).
180
Standing requires showing three elements: injury in fact, causal connection
to a defendant, and redressability. 504 U.S. at 560-61. This is a lesser burden than
causation. As Richard Fallon argues, “the causation requirement of personal interest
standing is not that of proximate cause. It seems instead to replicate the tort law
concept of ‘cause in fact’ or ‘but for’ causation.” Fallon, supra note 178, at 17; see
also Epstein, supra note 174.

54

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

Of course, more detailed causal connection would ultimately be
needed to establish liability.181 This would likely depend on a showing
that slave descendants are statistically less prosperous than appropriate
control groups. In any event, statistical tools would be invaluable in
showing causation, both the basic causation level required to show
standing, and the more rigorous showing that would be needed to
establish liability. Other tort doctrines will also be useful at the
liability stage. For example, it might make sense for a court to use a
substantial factor test to determine liability. Statistics would probably
play a major role in that inquiry as well, to show whether slave descent
is indeed a substantial factor in determining the prosperity of slave
descendants.
3. Wrongdoer Attenuation
Finally, the framework for apportioning liability set out in Sindell
and other DES cases may provide a means of overcoming wrongdoer
attenuation. In Sindell, the court found that DES manufacturers could
be held liable despite the inability of plaintiffs to connect directly the
manufacturers to the plaintiffs’ harm. That court noted, “as between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of injury.”182 Similar reasoning applies in reparations: Where
the choice is between letting harm lie with descendants of innocent
slaves, or with the corporate entities who participated in slavery, it
makes sense to favor slave descendants. Sindell apportioned liability
according to the market share of each defendant.183 That framework,
181

See Fallon, supra note 178, at 17-18 (discussing difference between
causation and standing requirements); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
292, 307 n.70 (1982) (noting this difference); Epstein, supra note 174, at 1181
(same).
182
26 Cal.3d at 610-11.
183
The Sindell court used proportional liability, allocating liability between the
defendants in proportion to their market share. Id. at 612-13.

55

CAUSATION AND ATTENUATION

if adopted in the reparations context, could potentially resolve many
thorny distributional questions.
There are, however, significant conceptual hurdles that could
impede application of Sindell to reparations. In Sindell, the major
players in the DES market – who collectively comprised a large
majority of the relevant market actors – were all joined in the
litigation.184 Because of this, the Sindell apportionment scheme
seemed fair in a broad sense – most of the market was represented by
the defendants joined in the case, and the only question was how to
divide liability between apparently liable parties.
In contrast, market share liability in the reparations context is less
compelling, precisely because it is not possible to join individual
defendants representing even a majority of the slavery market. Certain
long-lived individual corporate slave market participants still exist,
and are defendants in reparations litigation. It is all but certain,
however, that the majority of the private actor participants in the slave
markets is no longer in existence, or cannot be matched with any
current defendant. Existing reparations defendants represent only a
small percent of the original slavery market. The market coverage of
joined defendants in the reparations litigation thus differs drastically
from the market coverage present in Sindell. Because of that
difference, direct application of a Sindell framework is not possible
without some kind of modification.
Various possibilities exist for adapting Sindell to the slavery
market. One possibility would be to join government actors as
additional defendants. This route has the benefit of seeming to create
a somewhat Sindell-like level of market coverage. Combined with
corporate defendants, government actors could be viewed as
comprising much of the slave market. However, any attempt to join
government actors runs into a host of problems, starting with
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Id. at 611-12 (noting that joined defendants comprised 90 percent of the
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sovereign immunity.185 In addition, it is not clear that joining
government actors would actually result in a Sindell-like level of
market coverage among the universe of joined defendants.
Government and corporate entities played different and often
overlapping roles in the slave market. It is not clear that adding
government actors would alter the market coverage of joined
defendants and make Sindell application any easier.
Another possibility would be to hold currently joined reparations
defendants liable for the acts of other participants in the market for
slavery, who have not been joined in the litigation. This approach is
similar to “enterprise liability” theories which hold that any actors in
an enterprise can be found liable for harms it causes.186 Under such a
system, individual corporate actors could be held liable not only for
their own share of the original market, but also for the market share of
the many other actors no longer in existence. This would result in
much greater potential monetary recovery for plaintiffs, since no
portion of the original market would be written off as judgment proof.
However, by imputing to existing defendants the shares of judgment
proof former market participants, such a framework raises potentially
insuperable questions of fairness.
Finally, Sindell could be adapted in a more limited fashion to allow
for pro rata recovery according to the market share of existing
defendants. Under such a system, each defendant would be liable for
its own portion of the original market for slavery, as defendants in
Sindell were liable for their portions of the DES market. However,
those portions of the initial market not represented by current
defendants – almost certainly the vast majority of the market for
slavery – would simply be written off as uncollectible. Thus if slave
descendants can join defendants representing 10% of the slave market,
185
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(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Weinstein, supra note 41, at 149-52 (discussing enterprise
liability).
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then they can collect damages representing 10% of the economic harm
suffered by slave descendants. The remaining 90% would be
attributable to non-collectable (perhaps non-existent) entities. This
approach would provide a lower level of potential monetary recovery
to slave descendants, since the majority of claims would be written off
as uncollectible. (Those would be the claims attributed to participants
in the original market, who are not joined to the current litigation).
However, because this modification would not force any defendant to
pay for harm greater than its percent of market share, it is the least
problematic route from a fairness standpoint.
B. Unjust Enrichment
Although the foregoing analysis is addressed to torts, much of it
would apply to unjust enrichment claims as well. For example, unjust
enrichment claimants could use statistical evidence to attack victim
attenuation arguments. And Sindell-like market share restitution
would be a way of avoiding wrongdoer attenuation in unjust
enrichment cases, as well as in tort cases.
The possibility of apportioning liability according to market shares
is particularly attractive in the unjust enrichment context. Some
scholars believe that unjust enrichment claims are the best opportunity
for reparations.187 Unjust enrichment offers significant advantages,
including its lower threshold of proof (more likely than not).188 As
others have noted, however, unjust enrichment claims run into
difficulty at the remedy stage.189 The question of how to apportion
blame is not at all clear. Thus, while unjust enrichment can answer
some of the problems inherent in tort claims, they do not provide a
clear avenue for remedy.
Sindell market-share apportionment may be the best way to
convert unjust enrichment claims from academic fantasy into legal
187
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reality. If market share liability provides a solution to the tracing
problem, unjust enrichment claims may become more viable. Like the
DES case addressed in Sindell, unjust enrichment claims run into the
problem of tracing. But also like Sindell, the harm alleged is largely
fungible. Thus, market share liability in unjust enrichment is
appropriate. This solution is attractive because it is easy to implement.
It skips thorny theory questions at the implementation stage, offering a
viable method to calculate each defendant’s contribution.
Finally, unjust enrichment claims might also benefit from
statistical analysis. Victim and act attenuation problems in unjust
enrichment, like in tort, can be addressed through the use of statistical
evidence.
C. Recap
This Part has examined the idea of causation. It is apparent that
legal attenuation critiques, including the Slave Descendants court’s
analysis, are oversimplified. The question of causation in reparations
requires analysis of underdetermined causation, which does not always
preclude liability. Reparations advocates should use the tools of mass
tort, particularly statistical causation, to establish liability. Statistical
tools may be used to show harm to modern claimants, resolving legal
concerns of victim and act attenuation and addressing standing
concerns. And conceptual tools used in the DES and other cases,
including modified Sindell-style market share liability, can be used to
address wrongdoer attenuation.
VI. Conclusion
Much remains to be done. Reparations advocates must test
statistical causation arguments to see if they satisfy courts’ lack of
harm and standing concerns. The argument should be further
developed and refined for use in showing causation at trial, ultimately
addressing act attenuation concerns that arise at that stage. And the
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Sindell harm contribution analysis should be employed as needed to
address wrongdoer attenuation.
Future steps might include tying these causal tools to particular
proposals for asset distribution. It is nearly impossible to discuss
reparations today without at least a nod to the many distribution
critiques raised by critics.190
Questions of direct or group
compensation – themselves beyond the scope of this Article -- will
eventually need to be answered. However, these may also eventually
turn out to be questions best answered by examining the mass tort
experience, with its models for distribution to victims.191
Despite the work that remains to be done, this Article shows that
theoretical tools from the mass tort context may be helpful in
addressing attenuation in the reparations debate. Indeed, it turns out
that attenuation, like many other concerns about reparations, may
provide “grist for the mill of reparations critics, but [is] familiar in law,
and the law has developed methods for dealing with (or ignoring)
[it].”192
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